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Cost Restrained Hybrid Attacks in Power Grids
Xiaolin Gao, Cunlai Pu, and Lunbo Li
Abstract—The frequent occurrences of cascading failures in
power grids have been receiving continuous attention in recent
years. An urgent task for us is to understand the cascading
failure vulnerability of power grids against various kinds of
attacks. We consider a cost restrained hybrid attack problem
in power grids, in which both nodes and links are targeted with
a limited total attack cost. We propose an attack centrality metric
for a component (node or link) based on the consequence and
cost of the removal of the component. Depending on the width
of cascading failures considered, the attack centrality can be a
local or global attack centrality. With the attack centrality, we
further provide a greedy hybrid attack, and an optimal hybrid
attack with the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) framework.
Simulation results on IEEE bus test data show that the optimal
hybrid attack is more efficient than the greedy hybrid attack.
Furthermore, we find counterintuitively that the local centrality
based algorithms are better than the global centrality based ones
when the cost constraint is considered in the attack problem.
Our work can help in the robustness optimization of power
systems by revealing their worst-case attack vulnerability and
most vulnerable components.
Index Terms—Cascading failure, network attack, power grid,
constrained optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN power grids, a small-scale broken down of componentscan result in large-scale cascading failures or blackouts
that cause catastrophic consequences. In the past year, large
blackouts have hit many places in the world including the US,
Australia, Argentina, and Venezuela. The scale and frequency
of blackouts are continuously growing due to the increasing
interconnection in power infrastructures. The causes of the
cascading failures can be the faults at power stations, damage
to electric transmission lines, and deliberate network attacks.
It is of great significance to have a profound understanding of
the cascading failure vulnerability of power girds.
The topic of cascading failures has received great attention
from the area of network science. A branch of research work
was focused on the modeling and analysis of cascading failures
[1]. Ren et al. [2] proposed a cascading failure model for
communication networks, in which each overloaded element
has a probability of failure. Jiang et al. [3] provided a
heuristic algorithm to discover key nodes in cascading failures.
Chen et al. [4] further performed a critical node analysis on
interdependent power and communication networks to identify
the vital nodes in cascading failures. Lee et al. [5] considered
the data injection attacks and provided the associated load
redistribution model in cascading failures. Pu et al. [6] pro-
posed a link centrality measure based on both topological and
electrical properties and further studied the cascading failures
induced by the link centrality based attacks.
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On the other hand, various works have been devoted to the
defense of cascading failures. Jiang et al. [7] proposed a local
load redistribution mechanism with the given node capacity
distribution, which is applied to the mitigation of cascading
failures. Zhou et al. [8] investigated the impending breakdown
prediction of the network by monitoring the critical indicators,
and further provided a node addition strategy to prevent the
collapse of the network under cascading failures. In order to
restore the network during cascading failures, Huang et al. [9]
gave the result-oriented and resource-oriented restoration ap-
proaches respectively. Xu et al. [10] discussed the optimization
of the allocation of the limited recovery resources to repair the
failed nodes in cascading failures. Tu et al. [11] studied how
the topological metrics affect the robustness of power grids
and used the simulated annealing method to find the optimal
network topology against cascading failures. Wang et al. [12]
discussed three optimization algorithms aiming at enhancing
network robustness against cascading failures included by link
attacks.
As far as we know, the existing work considered attacking
either nodes or links that the hybrid attack including both
types of components has been rarely reported, which, however,
happens in real situation. More importantly, an attack usually
has a cost in any situation, and the costs for attacking a node
and a link are usually different. Since removing a node is
equivalent to removing all the links associated with the node,
it is reasonable to assume that the cost for attacking this node
is equal to the cost for attacking all the links incident from
the node. Therefore, from an adversary’s perspective, it needs
to optimize the selection of nodes and links for attacks when
the total attack cost is given, in order to achieve a large attack
performance.
In this paper, we study the robustness of power grids against
the cost restrained hybrid attacks and their resulting cascading
failures. The contributions of our work are summarized as
follows.
• We formalize a cost restrained hybrid attack problem.
In particular, we seek the best combination of nodes
and links in power grids with a given total attack cost,
removing which will lead to the largest scale of cascading
failure. We prove that this optimization problem is NP-
hard.
• Based on the damage and cost of attacking a component,
we propose an attack centrality metric. With this metric,
we further provide greedy hybrid attack algorithms and
optimal hybrid attack algorithms, which embody the
particle swarm optimization (PSO) framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide
the cascading failure model in Section II. In Section III, we
present the cost restrained hybrid attack problem. In Section
2IV, we introduce our attack centrality measurement and its
related greedy and optimal attacks. Simulation results are
presented in Section V. Finally, we conclude our work in
Section VI.
II. MODEL OF CASCADING FAILURES
To obtain the topological structure of a power grid, we can
take the base stations and transmission lines simply as nodes
and links respectively, and then the corresponding network
topology can be represented by an undirected graph G(V,E),
where V and E denote the sets of nodes and links, respectively.
The grid network has then N = |V | nodes andM = |E| links
accordingly.
Following Ref. [11], we consider two types of nodes: gen-
eration nodes and consumer nodes. Then, the corresponding
admittance matrix of a power grid can be written as


. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . yi 0 . . .
. . . −Yji Yjj . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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vi
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. . .
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 =
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. . .
vi
Ij
. . .

 , (1)
which is obtained according to the Kirchhoff’s law equations.
In Eq. (1), the subscripts i and j represent generation node and
consumer node, respectively; v and I represent the voltage and
external injected current, respectively; the element Yij is the
admittance of the link connecting nodes i and j, and Yij = 0
if nodes i and j are not connected. Moreover, we have yi = 1
for a generation node i and Yjj = −
∑
s6=j Yjs for a consumer
node j, which are ensured by the Kirchhoff’s law. Usually, the
grid topology, link admittances, voltages of generation nodes,
and current consumptions of consumer nodes are given as the
prior information. Then, the voltages of consumer nodes can
be obtained using Eq. (1).
Following Ref [11], we define that the load on link (s, d) is
equal to its current flow, Isd = (vs − vd) × Ysd; the load on
node s is vs × Ios, where Ios is the total current flowing out
of node s. The capacity (maximum allowed load) of a node is
defined as (1 + α) times its initial load, and the capacity of a
link is set to be (1 + β) times its initial load, where α and β
are safety margins of nodes and links, respectively. If the load
of a component exceeds the given capacity, the component is
considered to be failed and will be removed from the grid.
In power grid, an initial small-scale failure of components
can further cause the overload of other components and
eventually the cascading failures. The whole process of a
cascading failure in the power grid, can be modeled as follows:
1) Initially, some components are removed from the grid,
which usually represents the initial attack.
2) The load of each remaining component is recalculated,
and if the current load of a component exceeds the given
capacity, it will be removed immediately from the grid.
3) It is possible that the grid are split into multiple isolated
subgrids after the removal of components. For a subgrid
containing no generator nodes, all components in this
subgrid are considered as unserved and are removed
accordingly.
4) Repeat steps 2) and 3) until all existing components
operate under capacity constraints.
A simple way for quantifying the consequence or damage
of an attack on the grid is to calculate the fraction of the failed
components. Usually, we exclude the number of components
manually removed at the beginning to fairly evaluate the
performance of an attack. Based on this idea, the damage of
an attack is given by
Φ =
Nunserved −Nattacked
D −Nattacked
, (2)
where Nunserved is the total number of unserved components
after cascading failures; Nattacked is the number of initially
removed components; D is the number of all components at
the beginning, which equals to N +M .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In our cost constraint hybrid attack model, we remove a
selected set of components containing both nodes and links
from the grid under a cost constraint, which acknowledges the
fact that usually removing a node or link has a cost. Generally,
the larger the admittance of a circuit, the larger the price of
the circuit is [13]. Thus, we assume the cost of removing a
link is γ times its admittance. Since the removal of a node is
equivalent to the removal of all its incident links, we further
assume that the attack cost of a node is the sum of the cost
of all the links incident on the node. For component i, we
denote its attack cost by ci. The maximum total attack cost
allowed in the attack is given to be proportional to the sum of
the attack cost of all components in the grid,
C0 = θ
D∑
i=1
ci, (3)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the control parameter of total attack cost
C0. The larger θ generally means more components can be
removed in the attack.
We define the solution of an attack as X =
[x1, x2, · · · , xD], where xi = 1 if component i is attacked,
otherwise xi = 0. The cost of the attack solution X can be
written as
C(X) =
D∑
i=1
ci ∗ xi. (4)
Definition 1 (Optimal Component Set Problem): Given an
attack cost C0, find the optimal component set, the removal
of which will result in the largest damage Φ.
The optimal component set problem (OCSP) can be formal-
ized as
maximize
X
Φ(X)
subject to C(X) ≤ C0.
(5)
Note that the number of attacked componentsK is not given
as precondition, which eventually depends on the optimal
attack solution.
Theorem 1: The OCSP is NP -hard.
Proof: For a meaningful attack, the number of failed
components in the cascading failure should be significantly
3larger than the number of components manually removed at
the beginning, i.e., Nunserved ≫ Nattacked. Thus, the damage
Φ is approximately linearly dependent on Nunserved based on
Eq. (2). In other words, the OCSP is essentially equivalent to
seeking an optimal constrained hybrid attack that maximizes
Nunserved. On the other hand, the problem of maximizing
Nunserved is similar with the 0/1 knapsack problem [14]: given
N items numbered 1 to N , each with a weight wi and a value
vi, seek a collection S of items such that
∑
i∈S wi ≤W (the
total weight constraint) and the total value
∑
i∈S vi is as large
as possible. In the problem of maximizing Nunserved, if we
set D = N , ci = wi and Nunserved(i) = vi (Nunserved(i)
represents the number of unserved components caused by the
removal of component i), then this problem is equivalent to
the 0/1 knapsack problem. Note that we can artificially fix
the double-counting of failed components in the calculation
of Nunserved(i). Collectively, the 0/1 knapsack problem can
be reduced to the OCSP in polynomial time. Since the 0/1
knapsack problem is a well known NP -hard problem, the
OCSP is also NP -hard.
IV. ATTACK CENTRALITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN
ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we first propose an attack centrality metric,
which considers both the damage and cost of removing a com-
ponent. Then, we employ the attack centrality to design greedy
and optimal algorithms. We also discuss the computational
cost of the proposed algorithms.
A. Attack centrality
Different from previous work, where the attack consequence
was the only concern, we consider the attack consequence and
attack cost simultaneously in our work. Specifically, we define
the attack centrality of a component as the ratio of the total
attack cost of the failed components caused by the removal of
the component to the attack cost of the component itself. For
component i, its attack centrality is
ψ(i) =
∑
j∈Ωi
cj
ci
, (6)
where Ωi is the set of components failed in the cascading
failures triggered by the removal of component i. This cen-
trality metric essentially indicates the cost-effectiveness of
attacking a single component. Note that in the simulation, the
computational cost increases with the increase of the width
of the cascading failure, and the total cascading width may
be different for different components. Thus, we consider two
special cases of cascading width, i.e., width one and the
total width of a cascading failure, corresponding to the local
and global attack centralities, respectively. In other words, to
measure the local centrality of a component, we only consider
the failed components of width one in the cascading failure
caused by the removal of the component, while considering all
failed components in the whole cascading process to calculate
its global centrality.
B. Greedy hybrid attack
In the greedy attack, we first rank all components in the
decreasing order of their attack centrality. Then, we select the
components from the top of the ranking under the given con-
straint of the total attack cost. Finally, we remove the selected
components simultaneously from the grid, and evaluate the
subsequent cascading failure based on Eq. (2).
The proposed local and global attack centralities are em-
ployed in the greedy attack and thus yield two greedy attack
algorithms, which are called local centrality based greedy
hybrid attack (LC-GHA) and global centrality based greedy
hybrid attack (GC-GHA), respectively. We also consider the
random hybrid attack (RHA) for the comparative purpose, in
which we randomly remove a set of components under the
total attack cost limit.
The time complexity of the greedy hybrid attack is O(D),
when the width of a cascading failure is ignored due to
its randomness. In practice, LC-GHA always has a much
lower computational cost than GC-GHA, since only width
one of a cascading failure is considered in the calculation
of attack centrality for LC-GHA. Also, RHA has the lowest
computational complexity, since it does not need to calculate
attack centrality.
C. Optimal hybrid attack
Since the OCSP is NP hard, we use the particle warm
optimization (PSO) framework to seek its optimal solution.
The general procedure of the PSO in our attack scenario is as
follows.
1) Initialize n particles. A particle i is represented by a
D-dimensional vector Xi, in which each element is
independently set to a random value in [0, 1]. Let X˜i
be a replica of Xi. We then set the largest K elements
in X˜ under the total attack cost constraint to 1 and the
rest to 0.
2) Calculate Φ(X˜i) by using Eq. (2) for each particle i,
which is also called the fitness in PSO. Then, update
the local and global optimal solutions for the particle
swarm.
3) Update the velocity and position of the particles. Repeat
step 2) until the maximum number of iterations tmax is
reached.
The velocity and position of particle i update with the
following equations:

vi
t+1=wtvi
t+c1r1
t(pibest−xi
t)+c2r2
t(gbest−xi
t),
xi
t+1=xi
t+vi
t,
wt+1=wmax−
t∗(wmax−wmin)
tmax
.
(7)
In the above equations, vti is the velocity of node i at time
step t; xti represents the position of node i at time step t;
wt is the inertia coefficient at time step t; wmax and wmin
are respectively the maximum and minimum values of w; c1
and c2 are respectively the cognitive coefficient and the social
learning coefficient; both rt1 and r
t
2 are random values in [0,
1], which are independently generated at time step t.
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Fig. 1. The damage Φ vs. the cost control parameter θ under three greedy
hybrid attack strategies: LC-GHA, GC-GHA and RHA on two IEEE bus test
data.
In theory, the PSO based optimal hybrid attack algorithm,
named as OHA, can find out the optimal attack solution Xopt
under a given total attack cost constraint for a sufficiently
large number of iterations. Nevertheless, in real situations
tmax is always limited, and the quality of the solution is
not guaranteed. Therefore, we further improve the OHA by
applying our attack centrality to the optimization of the initial
solution. Specifically, in the initialization phase, we randomly
select one particle and set the corresponding X with the
values of the attack centrality of the components. Moreover,
inspired by the genetic algorithm [15], we utilize the mutation
mechanism to reset the particles to avoid their falling into the
local optima. Specifically, after each iteration, the mutation
from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0 is carried out for an element of
the current optimal solution, which is selected randomly.
Depending on the local or global attack centrality used in the
optimization, we have local centrality based optimal hybrid
attack (LC-OHA) or global centrality based optimal hybrid
attack (GC-OHA), respectively. The time complexity of these
two optimal hybrid attack algorithms are both O(n ∗ tmax)
without considering the duration of the single cascading failure
process. The pseudocode of the centrality based optimal hybrid
attack is in Algorithm 1.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms on IEEE 118 bus and IEEE 162 bus data by using
MATLAB. The topologies of the networks and the generation
nodes are all given in the data. For the simplification purpose,
we set that the voltage of generation nodes is 1 p.u. (per
unit), the current of the consumer nodes is 1 p.u., and the
admittances of the links follow a normal distribution with an
average value of 11 p.u. and a standard deviation of 2 p.u,
which basically follow ref. [11]. The cost parameter γ is set
to be 0.3. The safety margins are usually small and thus set
to be α = β = 0.2 in the experiments. The parameters for the
particle swarm are empirically set as n = 10, c1 = c2 = 2,
wmax = 0.9, wmin = 0.4 and tmax = 200.
First, we present the results of the greedy hybrid attacks,
i.e., LC-GHA and GC-GHA, with a comparison with RHA
in Fig. 1, which are the average of 50 independent runs. For
each histogram, the light and dark colors correspond to the
fractions of links and nodes among all the attacked compo-
nents, respectively. We see from Fig. 1 that instead of single
Algorithm 1 Attack centrality based optimal hybrid attack
Input: The given total attack cost C0; Number of particles n;
Particle dimension D; Number of iterations tmax;
Output: Optimal K-component set;
1: Calculate the attack centrality of each component;
2: Initialisation: Given n particles, each one is represented by
a D-dimensional vector X . For particle i, independently
set each element of Xi to be a random value in [0, 1].
Randomly select a particle X , and reset its elements to be
the values of the attack centrality of the components, i.e.,
xk = ψ(k). Assume X˜i is a replica of Xi, and then set
the largest K elements in X˜i to 1 and the rest to 0 with
the constraint C(X˜i) ≤ C0;
3: for each particle do
4: Calculate its fitness Φ(X˜);
5: end for
6: Update the global optimal value gbest of the particle
swarm;
7: for t = 1 : tmax do
8: Generate a random number b ∈ [0, 1];
9: for j = 1 : n do
10: if j == b then
11: Xj ← gbest;
12: Select an element of Xj and conduct the mu-
tation from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0;
13: end if
14: Update the velocity and position of particle Xj ;
15: Copy Xj to X˜j and set the largest K elements in
X˜j to 1 and the rest to 0 under the cost limit;
16: Calculate the fitness Φ(X˜j);
17: Update the optimal solution p
j
best of particle j and
the global optimal solution gbest of the particle swarm;
18: end for
19: end for
20: return the optimal K-component set corresponding to
gbest.
type of components, both links and nodes are attacked for all
the three algorithms to achieve a good attack performance.
This indicates that when attack cost is also a major concern,
it is necessary to weigh all types of components for a cost-
effective attack.
Furthermore, the damage Φ of LC-GHA is larger than the
GC-GHA and RHA for the same attack cost. The evidence
that LC-GHA is better than GC-GHA is quite counterintuitive,
since the global centrality calculated with more information
and computational cost is expected to be more effective than
local centrality in a general sense. In our cost constrained
hybrid attack model, the attack centrality of a component is a
trade-off between the attack performance and attack cost. This
yields that a node with a larger attack performance may not
has a larger attack centrality than a link with a smaller attack
performance, since node generally has a larger attack cost
than link. Therefore, the links with large attack performance
especially in the GC-GHA are attacked with high priority,
which is why the fraction of attacked links is always larger
5than that of attacked nodes in the greedy attacks. The larger
tendency to links in the GC-GHA compared to that in the
LC-GHA leads to the lower efficiency of the former than the
latter. RHA always has the lowest efficiency due to its nature
of randomness.
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Fig. 2. The damage Φ vs. the number of iterations for LC-OHA, GC-OHA
and OHA on IEEE 118 bus data with θ = 0.2 and θ = 0.3, respectively.
Next, we evaluate the performance of optimal hybrid at-
tacks, i.e., LC-OHA and GC-OHA, with a comparison with
OHA. Fig. 2 shows the relation between the damage Φ and
the number of iterations for the three optimal hybrid attacks.
We can see clearly that with the increase of the iterations,
the damage generally increases and then converges for all
the optimal hybrid attacks. Interestingly, LC-OHA converges
faster with a higher damage than GC-OHA, which together
with its lower computational cost demonstrates its advantage
over GC-OHA. The OHA always has the lowest efficiency
owing to no optimization of initialization.
Finally, we compare the performance of all the greedy
and optimal hybrid attacks. The results of damage vs. cost
constraint are given in Fig. 3, which are the average of
100 independent realizations. We see that the optimal hybrid
attacks noticeably outperform the greedy hybrid attacks for
achieving a larger attack performance under an arbitrary
cost constraint. The decreasing order of efficiency is LC-
OHA > GC-OHA > OHA > LC-GHA > GC-GHA > RHA,
which further confirms that the local attack centrality is
better than the global one in the cost-constrained hybrid
attack problem. Note that generally the greedy attacks have
a much smaller computational cost than the optimal attacks.
In addition, we observe that with the relaxation of cost limit,
the damage Φ first increases and then decreases after the peak
for all hybrid attacks. When the allowed total attack cost is
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0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
LC-OHA
GC-OHA
LC-GHA
GC-GHA
OHA
RHA
Fig. 3. The damage Φ vs. the cost control parameter θ for all the greedy
and optimal hybrid attacks on IEEE 118 bus data.
small, the damage increases with the cost, i.e., the scale of
failed components in the cascading failure increases with the
growth of the attack cost. While when the cost constraint is
large enough, the number of failed components (except those
removed at the beginning) tends to be stable as the attack cost
grows, which accounts for the decrease of Φ (see Eq. (2)).
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have first discussed the cost constrained
hybrid attacks and their induced cascading failures in power
grids. The formulated optimization problem, which is proved
to be NP hard, aims at finding the optimal set of components
to be attacked under a given attack cost constraint. We
proposed an attack centrality measure by considering the cost-
effectiveness of attacking a component, and further provided
the attack centrality based greedy algorithms and optimal
algorithms, which embody the framework of PSO. The per-
formance of these algorithms have been validated through the
experiments on IEEE bus data. A promising future direction
would be to develop a multiple-object optimization framework
for the cost-restrained attack problem. Our work helps in
assessing the vulnerability of power grid infrastructures.
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